Digital fingerprinting is an effective method to identify users who might try to redistribute multimedia content, such as images and video. These fingerprints are typically embedded into the content using watermarking techniques that are designed to be robust to a variety of attacks. A cheap and effective attack against such digital fingerprints is collusion, where several differently marked copies of the same content are averaged or combined to disrupt the underlying fingerprint. We present a construction of collusionresistant fingerprints based upon anti-collusion codes (ACC) and binary code modulation. ACC have the property that the composition of any subset of K or fewer codevectors is unique. Using this property, we build fingerprints that allow for the identification of groups of K or less colluders. We present a construction of binary-valued ACC under the logical AND operation using the theory of combinatorial designs. Our code construction requires only O( fi) orthogonal signals to accommodate n users. We demonstrate the performance of our ACC for fingerprinting multimedia by identifying colluders through experiments using real images.
INTRODUCTION
The development of ubiquitous broadband communication networks and multimedia technologies will lead to the creation of a digital marketplace where a broad range of multimedia content, such as images, video, audio and speech, will be available. However, before viable businesses can be established to market content on these networks, mechanisms must be in place to ensure that content is used for its intended purpose, and by legitimate users who have purchased appropriate distribution rights.
In order to control the redistribution of content, digital fingerprinting is used to trace the consumers who use their content for unintended purposes [l] . These fingerprints can be embedded in multimedia content through a variety of watermarking techniques [2, 31 . Collusion attacks provide a cost-effective approach to removing an identifying watermark. One of the simplest approaches to performing a collusion attack is to average multiple copies of the content together [4] . Other collusion attacks might involve forming a new content by selecting different pixels or blocks from the different colluders' content. By gathering a large enough coalition of colluders, it is possible to sufficiently attenuate each of the colluders' identifying fingerprints and produce a new version of the content with no detectable fingerprints. It is therefore important to design fingerprints that resist collusion and identify the colluders, thereby discouraging attempts at collusion by the users.
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The problem of designing fingerprints that are resistant to collusion has been considered for generic digital data in [ 11. Such generic schemes, however, do not consider the actual marking process associated with specific applications and media types. Indeed, the design of collusion-resistant fingerprinting should consider application-specific issues such as the inherent, special prop-. erties of multimedia data since the fingerprinting process for multimedia involves a chain of events including the selection of the embedding method and appropriate choice of detection statistics.
In this paper, we investigate the problem of making fingerprints for multimedia content, such as images and video, that are resistant to collusion attacks by averaging. In Section 2 we describe multimedia fingerprinting, and introduce the problem of user collusion for a class of additive watermark schemes. In Section 3, we present our design of anti-collusion codes (ACC), which are used in conjunction with binary code modulation to construct fingerprints that are resistant to collusion and able to identify members of a colluder set. The proposed ACC concept is applicable to all multimedia data types. For the convenience of discussion, however, we will use images in our experiments, since the extension to audio or video is straightforward. Finally, we present conclusions in Section 4.
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FINGERPRINTING AND COLLUSION
In this section, we will review additive embedding, where a watermark signal is added to a host signal. Suppose that the host signal is a vector denoted as x and that we have a family of watermarks {wj} that are fingerprints associated with the different users who purchase the rights to access x. Before the watermarks are added to the host signal, every component of each wj is scaled by an appropriate factor that corresponds to an amplification, i.e. s j ( k ) = a(k)wj(k), where we refer the the kth component of a vector wj by wj(k). Corresponding to each user is a marked version of the content t j = x + s j , which typically experiences additional distortion z j that is due to such factors as compression and attacks made to remove the embedded fingerprints. We will denote the combination of the noise and the interference of the original signal by dj = x + z j . We can thus assume that each user will be given a marked content yj = s j + dj. Typically, the watermarks {wj} are chosen to correspond to orthogonal noiselike signals [2] , or are constructed using code modulation and represented using a basis of orthogonal noiselike signals ui via
where bij E {0,1} or bij E {f1} [5] . The first case corresponds to the on-off keying form of code modulation, and makes less effi-cient usage of energy than the second case, which corresponds to the antipodal form of code modulation. Therefore, we shall only consider bij E { f l} for the remainder of the paper.
We can identify a user who is redistributing marked content y3 by detecting the watermark associated with the user to whom y j was sold. The detection of additive watermarks can be formulated as a hypothesis testing problem, where the embedded data is considered as the signal that is to be detected in the presence of noise.
For the popular spread spectrum embedding [Z, 31, the detection performance can be studied via the following simplified antipodal model:
where { s i } is a deterministic spreading sequence (often called the watermark), b is the one bit to be embedded and is used to antipodally modulate si, di is the total noise. and N is the number of sampleskoefficients to carry the hidden information. In non-blind detection, where the original source is available, di comes from the processing andor attacks: in blind detection, di consists of the host media as well as distortion from processing and attacks. If di is modelled as i.i.d. Gaussian "(0, U:), the optimal detector is a (normalized) correlator with a detection statistics TN given by In this paper, we use the correlator with normalized noise variance as described in (4).
When two parties who have the same image but fingerprinted differently come together, they can perform a collusion attack to generate a new image from the two fingerprinted images so that the traces of either fingerprint in the new image is attenuated. For fingerprinting through additive embedding, this can be done by averaging the two fingerprinted images y c = Xlyl + X2y2 where A1 + X 2 = 1. so that the energy of each of the fingerprints is reduced to X i 2 of the corresponding original and the detection statistics with respect to the i-th fingerprint is scaled by a factor of X i . Collusion can be extended to more than two parties. In a K-colluder averaging-collusion the watermarked content signals yj are combined according to E,"=, X j y j . The objective of each colluder is to avoid being detected, yet remain fair to his fellow colluders and retain good image quality. We have shown in [6], that under realistic assumptions about the detection statistics for each user, choosing X j = 1/K for all j is that most fair choice for each colluder to avoid detection.
CODE MODULATION EMBEDDING AND ANTI-COLLUSION CODES
In this section we construct fingerprints using code modulation and appropriately designed codewords to construct a family of fingerprints that have the ability to identify the members of a colluding set of users. In code modulation, there are U orthogonal basis signals { u j } . and information is encoded into a watermark signal wj via (1) where bij E {fl}. At the detector side, the determination of each bij is done by correlating with the ui. and comparing against a decision threshold. We assign a different bit sequence {bij} for the ith user. We may view the assignment of the bits bij for different watermarks in a matrix B. which we call the derived code matrix, where each column of B contains a derived codevector for a different user. In the following section, we shall design a code matrix C with values from {0,1} and map C -+ B with values {fl} prior to use in code modulation.
In binary code modulation. if we average two watermarks, w1 and w2 corresponding to bit sequences bjl and b j 2 -then when bjl # bj2 the contributions cancel. However, when bjl = bjz the contributions do not attenuate.
Anti-Collusion Codes
In this section we design a family of codevectors { c 3 } whose overlap with each other can identify groups of colluding users. A similar idea was proposed in [7] , where projective geometry was used to construct such code sequences. As we will explain in this section, our proposed code conslruction makes more efficient usage of the basis vectors than the codes described in [7] .
We assume, when a sequence of watermarks is averaged and detection is performed, that the detected binary sequence is the logical AND of the codevectors c j used in constructing the watermarks. For example, when the watermarks corresponding to the codevectors (1110) and (1101) are averaged, the output of the detector is (1100). This assumption might not necessarily hold since the average of many 1's and a few 0's may produce a decision statistic large enough to pass through the detector as a 1.
We want to design codes such that when K or fewer users collude. we can identify the colluders. We prefer shorter codes since longer codes would distribute the fingerprint energy over more basis vectors, which would lead to a higher error rate in the detection process. To identify colluders, we first require that there is some non-zero component remaining in the code when the codes for these K colluders are combined. Secondly, we require that there are no repetitions in the different combinations of K or fewer codevectors. We call codes that satisfy these properties anticollusion codes.
Definition 1 A binary code C = {c', . . . , c"} such that the logical AND of any subset of k or fewer codevectors is non-zem and distinct fmm the logical AND of any other subset of k or fewer codevectors is a k-resilient AND anti-collusion code, or an AND-ACC code.
We present a ( n -1)-resilient AND-ACC. Let C consist of all n-bit binary vectors that have only a single 0 bit. For example, when n = 4, C = {1110,1101,1011,0111}. It is easy to see when K 5 n -1 of these vectors are combined under AND, that this combination is unique. This code has cardinality n, and can produce at most n differently watermarked media. It is desirable to shorten the codelength to squeeze more users into fewer basis
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Algorithm: SuspectAZg(r) 9 = 1; Define 3 to be the set of indices where r3 = 1 :
Define e3 to be the jth row of C; + = + . e 3 ; end I Algorithm 1: Algorithm SuspectAlg(I'), which determines the vector 9 that describes the suspect set.
vectors. We now present a construction of a K-resilient AND-ACC that requires a(&) basis vectors for n users.
Our construction uses balanced incomplete block designs (BIBD) [8] .
Corresponding to a block design is the U x n incidence matrix -1) ). By Fisher's Inequality [8] , we also know that n 2 U for a (v, k , A)-BIBD, and thus R 5 1 using the BIBD construction. In contrast, the k-resilient construction in [7] has rate much larger than 1, and thus requires more spreading sequences (or marking locations) to accommodate the same amount of users as our scheme. It is possible to use the collusion-secure code constructions of [l] in conjunction with code modulation for embedding. However, the construction described in [ 11 has codelength O(log4 n1og2(1/e)), where E < l / n is the decision error probability. This codelength is considerably large for small error probabilities and practical TI values. Additionally, for the same amount of users, the use of code modulation watermarking with an AND-ACC constructed using a ( U , k , 1)-BIBD requires v orthogonal sequences for n = (vz -v ) / ( k 2 -k ) users, while orthogonal signaling would require n sequences.
User 1: User 4:
Detector Design and Performance
In this section we focus on the detector involved in detecting collusion for binary code modulation. In order for the detector to determine whether ui. -ui, or neither exists in the test signal y, the detector correlates y with U%. If K colluders come together and average their marked content, then they produce an averaged test signal y whose contribution in the ui component is the average of the bi, values for that basis vector. The values of
User(1.4,8) Average: After thresholding:
User 8:
User ( Given that the output of the detector is a vector I? = (rl, rz, . . . , rn), we would like to narrow down the entire user set to a subset of suspect users by using r to determine a suspicious set from the entire user set. In Algorithm 1, we determine a vector % = (@I, @ z , . . . , @, , ) E (0, l}n that describes the suspicious set via the location of components whose value are 1. Thus, if @j = 1, then the jth user is suspected of colluding. In the algorithm, we denote the jth row vector of C by ej'. and use the fact that the element-wise multiplication "." of the binary vectors corresponds to the logical AND operation. The algorithm starts with I ' and = 1, where 1 is the n dimensional vector consisting of all ones. The algorithm then uses the indices where is equal to 1, and narrows down the suspicious set through updates to 9
by performing the AND of 9 with the rows of the code matrix C corresponding to indices where r is 1.
ACC Experiments with Images
In order to demonstrate the performance of our AND-ACC with code modulation fingerprinting on real images for fingerprinting users and detecting colluders, we used an additive spread spectrum watermarking scheme similar to that in [3] , where the perceptually weighted watermark was added to 8 x 8 block DCT coefficients.
The detection of the watermark is performed without the knowledge of the host image via the detection statistics as shown in (4).
In the simulations, we used a (16,4,1) BIBD [8] Figure 2 . The colluded images are further compressed using JPEG with quality factor (QF) 50%. Also shown in Figure 2 are the thresholds determined from the estimated mean of the detection statistics E ( T N ) . We then estimated the fingerprint codes by thresholding the detection statistics, and the estimated fingerprint codes are identical to the expected ones.
In Figure 3 , we present histograms of the TN statistics from several collusion cases with different distortions applied to the colluded Lema images. We see that there is a clear distinction between the three decision regions, facilitating the accurate determination of the AND-ACC codes from colluded images.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the problem of making fingerprints for multimedia content that are resistant to collusion attacks. We proposed anti-collusion codes (ACC) that are used in conjunction with modulation to fingerprint multimedia sources. Our anticollusion codes have the property that the composition of any subset of K or fewer codevectors is unique, which allows for the identification of subgroups of K or fewer colluders. We constructed binary-valued ACC under the logical AND operation using combinatorial designs. Our codes are efficient in that they require only O(fi) orthogonal signals to accommodate n users. For practical values of n this is an improvement over prior work on fingerprinting generic digital data. We evaluated our fingerprints on real images, and observed that the values of the detection statistics were well-separated. This behavior allows the detector to accurately determine the colluders by correctly extracting a fingerprint codevector that corresponds to the colluder set.
